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1. Introduction 
 
  Discussion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – the over-arching one of 
which is to halve the proportion of people living in absolute poverty by 2015 – has stimulated 
further interest in the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in assisting economic 
development. Although not designed as a development agency, much of the existing literature on 
the IMF deals with its relationship with developing countries and the impact of its operations on 
economic development. This impact may in part be felt through the financial assistance provided 
to countries with a balance of payments need. In principle, additional external finance should 
allow countries to cushion balance of payments adjustment and protect economic growth. 
Another part of the Fund’s impact may be felt through the adjustment advice it offers, and the 
conditionality that is written into IMF-supported programmes of economic reform. By 
influencing policy variables such as the fiscal balance, credit creation and the exchange rate, the 
Fund may exert an effect on outcomes such as the balance of payments, inflation, and economic 
growth. There are clearly implications here for economic development.
1  
  The recent debate about the Fund’s role in developing countries has occurred at various 
levels of aggregation. At one broad level, the debate has been about whether the Fund should be 
engaged in long-term lending to developing countries at all. Critics of the Fund’s involvement 
suggest that this lending does not exploit the institution’s comparative advantage. They argue 
that while the Fund should focus on providing short-term financing to countries in balance of 
payments crisis, what poor countries need is long-term development finance that would be more 
appropriately supplied by the World Bank, Regional Development Banks, or bi-lateral aid 
donors.
2 They argue that IMF conditionality has been ineffective in low-income countries, with   3
some critics going further and claiming that it has had negative effects on economic growth and 
poverty (see, for example, Vreeland, 2003). 
  At another more detailed and micro level, the debate has focused on the institutional 
modalities through which the IMF offers assistance to low-income countries. It examines the 
details of the principal facility used as a conduit for IMF assistance to poor countries; the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility. This debate is motivated by a desire to improve the facility, and 
thus engages primarily in evaluative efforts (IEO, 2004). 
  The issues raised in these debates are important and relevant. But they are wide-ranging. 
Instead of trying to provide a comprehensive survey of them, this paper adopts a narrower focus 
on an issue that is fundamental to any discussion about the Fund and developing countries. In 
short, the paper sets out to investigate the empirical relationship between the involvement of the 
IMF and the flow of bi-lateral foreign aid in the form of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). Consequently the key research question addressed here is whether IMF involvement is 
associated with additional aid flows to a country, or diminished flows.  Secondly, to the extent 
that there is any positive or negative association, is the catalytic effect  associated with particular 
IMF facilities, its provision of liquidity, or some other activity?   
  These questions are relevant since the answers to them will inform much of the debate 
about the IMF’s role in helping to achieve the MDGs. They will help in determining whether the 
Fund can withdraw from lending to poor countries safe in the assumption that its lending role 
will be taken on by aid donors. They will also inform much of the contemporary debate about the 
way in which the Fund can assist development. A central component of this debate is that the 
Fund becomes trapped into long-term lending to low-income countries that then make prolonged 
use of IMF resources in a manner some would see as inappropriate, an issue reviewed in   4
IEO(2002) and Bird (2004). As an alternative, aid donors may in fact be looking to the Fund to 
approve the design of (largely macroeconomic) reform and to monitor its implementation, rather 
than to provide its own resources. What they want is a signal, and yet, at present, it is only via 
conventional lending programmes that the Fund can effectively play this role. This would imply 
that there may be an excess supply of IMF resources to low income countries. A counter-
argument is that aid flows are largely dictated by other factors, that aid has been insufficient to 
facilitate economic development in recipient countries, and that a reduction in IMF lending 
would simply make bad matters worse, leaving poor countries with a larger financing gap. This 
approach argues for enhanced IMF lending to poor countries to fill the gap left by aid donors. 
Does the empirical evidence allow progress to be made in resolving these issues? 
  The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 examines the a priori reasoning 
underpinning the relationship between IMF programmes and aid flows. Section 3 provides some 
descriptive statistics about the relative sizes of IMF lending to low income countries and Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). It also looks at the distribution of IMF lending and bi-lateral 
aid. Section 4 builds on these data and uses regression analysis to investigate more formally the 
association between IMF programmes and ODA. Part of the problem in this context is to model 
the counterfactual. What would aid flows have been without the Fund’s involvement? The 
section also explores the extent to which aid donors are influenced by the resources provided by 
the Fund or by the conditionality incorporated in IMF programmes. Section 5 examines the 
policy implications of our findings, and suggests ways in which they help resolve some of the 
issues raised in discussions about the relationship between the IMF and developing countries, as 
well as the role of the IMF in helping to attain the MDGs. A final section offers some concluding 
remarks in the broader context of reforming the IMF and foreign aid.   5
2. Analytical Issues 
 
  The analytical basis for a catalytic relationship between IMF programmes and other 
sources of external finance has been most fully developed in the context of private capital flows 
(Bird and Rowlands, 1997, 2002, Morris and Shin, 2003, Mody and Savaria, 2003). In short, and 
in principle, IMF programmes may have a positive catalytic effect via their effects on liquidity, 
since they provide additional resources, and via their effects on economic policy, since they 
involve conditionality. Through the liquidity effect, an IMF programme may reduce the 
probability of a country defaulting, and this will make it more likely that short-term creditors will 
roll-over debt. Through the conditionality effect, a government may be able to transmit a signal 
to private markets that it is committed to the pursuit of a programme of sound economic policies 
that will then be monitored by the Fund. 
  However, theory does not unambiguously suggest that the catalytic effect will be 
positive. Additional resources, unaccompanied by effective conditionality, may allow 
governments to relax their adjustment effort. Even effective conditionality may, in principle, 
have a perverse effect by signaling the need for reform.
3 Furthermore, where the design of 
conditionality leads to higher interest rates, corporate and financial difficulties, and a loss of 
confidence in the government’s commitment to maintaining the value of the currency, foreign 
capital may be repelled. Given a poor record of implementation, IMF programmes and the 
conditionality they embody may also lack credibility (Bird, 2002). Conditionality may simply 
not be perceived as being effective by private capital markets. And, since studies of the use of 
IMF resources show that the incidence of contemporary programmes is closely and positively   6
related to the existence of past programmes, current involvement with the Fund may be 
interpreted as a lead indicator of future economic difficulties, resulting in negative catalysis.
4 
  As a consequence of the theoretical ambiguities, research into the catalytic effect of IMF 
programmes on private capital flows has usually concluded that it is an issue that needs to be 
resolved empirically. But is there reason to anticipate that the relationship between IMF 
programmes and bi-lateral foreign aid will be any different from that between IMF programmes 
and private capital flows? The short answer is “yes.” 
  The objective function of aid donors will differ strategically from that of private 
creditors. Indeed, it is this difference that, in effect, explains the existence of aid. Private 
creditors, it may be presumed, set out to maximize their risk-adjusted rate of return. Bi-lateral 
aid, in contrast, may be motivated by the donors’ assessment of their own interests – both 
commercial and political – and by the needs of recipients – both in terms of humanitarian factors 
and the scope for sustained economic growth that is not being facilitated by private capital 
markets.
5 Simply stated, poor countries that are unable to attract private capital may be expected 
to become dependent on foreign aid as the main source of external financing. Leading on from 
this point, if the IMF tends to be involved with countries that lack creditworthiness with private 
markets, it follows that it will occasionally have programmes with emerging economies that, for 
some reason, have temporarily lost their access to capital markets, and fairly frequently with low 
income countries that consistently find it difficult to attract private capital. This argument implies 
that while there may well be an overall negative association between IMF programmes and most 
forms of private capital, there will be a positive association with aid. 
   7
  But what factors might be motivating such a positive association, and how strong should 
we expect the association to be? Unlike private creditors, it seems improbable that aid donors 
will be looking to the IMF to resolve short-term liquidity problems that threaten default and 
financial crisis. In low income and aid-receiving countries IMF finance will not have a strategic 
importance in overcoming liquidity-related capital account crises, as it does in emerging 
economies. Rather, it seems much more probable that aid donors are looking to IMF involvement 
and to related conditionality to help design or endorse programmes of economic reform.
6 Donors 
will believe that the effectiveness of the aid they provide will be enhanced where the countries 
receiving it pursue sound economic policies.
7 But, at the same time, donors may feel less 
qualified than the IMF to carry out the role of designing reform and monitoring its 
implementation. They may therefore delegate this role to the IMF. Aid flows and Paris Club 
reschedulings, as well as access to debt relief via the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative 
(HIPC), have therefore been made conditional on the existence of IMF programmes; something 
that may have contributed to the prolonged use of IMF resources observed in many aid 
dependent low income countries. 
  Therefore a very different relationship should be expected to exist between IMF 
programmes and aid flows than between IMF programmes and private capital flows. In the case 
of private capital, it may be the liquidity effects of IMF programmes that lead to a reduction in 
the likelihood of default, and thereby increase the probability of rolling over debt and enticing of 
new private finance. In the case of foreign aid, the need for official bi-lateral flows, or the 
proximity of Paris Club rescheduling, may lead to IMF programmes; aid donors view IMF 
conditionality as a pre-requisite. Aid commitments may be made contemporaneously alongside   8
IMF programmes, and IMF resources may represent a residual, reflecting the difference between 
the commitments of aid donors and the estimated financing requirements of the programmes. 
  One of our analytical priors in this paper is therefore that there will be a positive 
association between IMF programmes and aid flows. Another is that it is probably IMF 
conditionality that is in some way driving this relationship rather than IMF resources. Even so, 
there are reasons to doubt the strength of these positive relationships. Bi-lateral official aid is 
different from multilateral aid. It is motivated by different factors. If, for example, it is motivated 
primarily by bi-lateral political factors, or indeed by humanitarian ones, it may be anticipated 
that the strength of the relationship exhibited between IMF programmes and aid flows will be 
limited. Certainly one might expect that there will be individual cases that are inconsistent with 
the norm; factors other than IMF involvement will be determining aid. Beyond this, if, over time, 
the significance of political factors in determining bi-lateral aid flows diminishes – as may have 
happened with the thawing of the Cold War – it may also be expected that the relationship 
between IMF programmes and aid flows will become stronger and more significant. 
 Going  beyond  these  a priori ideas, should we expect there to be any particular 
relationship between aid commitments and disbursements on the one hand and the contemporary 
implementation of IMF programmes on the other? And what about a country’s past record of 
implementation? There may be potentially countervailing factors at work. Aid commitments 
made at the outset of programmes should not, one might imagine, be influenced by the extent to 
which programmes are implemented. However, to the extent that disbursements differ from 
commitments, this could be because the commitments are in effect conditional on the continued 
implementation of agreed policies. Indeed, the evidence confirms that, generally speaking, 
disbursements often fall short of commitments (Foster and Keith, 2003).   9
  Even if it may be doubted whether implementation will affect the aid associated with 
contemporary programmes, it may seem more likely that countries with a track record of poor 
implementation will have greater difficulty in attracting aid. After all, the signaling effect of IMF 
programmes may be weaker in these cases.
8 But against this, poor implementation may, to some 
extent, reflect the size of the economic problems that countries face. On this basis, countries with 
a poor record of implementing IMF programmes may receive larger rather than smaller amounts 
of aid. Much may depend here on what donors perceive to be the causes of historically poor 
implementation. Are the causes beyond the control of governments?
9 
  We may be on safer ground to assume that the strength of any association between aid 
flows and IMF programmes will depend on the facility through which IMF assistance is provided 
and therefore on the per capita GDP of the countries concerned. Stand-by and Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF) loans are broadly aimed at better-off developing countries and emerging 
economies. Given the type of country that uses these facilities, it is doubtful that they will be 
heavily aid dependent. Poor countries, on the other hand, are likely to be dependent on aid and 
also relatively heavily dependent on the IMF’s concessionary window. 
  The analytical discussion presented above allows us to formulate a number of testable 
propositions. In terms of some relationships the analysis predicts a particular sign and strength. 
In other cases things are more ambiguous with, in principle, different factors pulling in opposite 
directions. The remainder of this paper sets out to test whether the evidence is consistent or 
inconsistent with these analytical priors, as well as to consider the policy implications of the 
empirical evidence.  
 
   10
3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Although, as Table 1 shows, there are a few exceptions such as India and Nigeria, low 
income countries generally have relatively little access to private capital. Instead, they rely on 
alternative sources of external finance. Over the period 1999-2003, Official Development 
Assistance was, in quantitative terms, about five times more important to them than private 
capital flows. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
  Low income countries also received financial assistance from the IMF. Under the Fund’s 
concessionary lending window (formerly the Enhanced Structural Adjustment facility, and now 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility), these flows were positive throughout the 1999-2003 
period. However, at a total amount of $1,918 million, it was dwarfed by ODA at $123,122 
million. Non-concessional lending from the Fund to low-income countries in net terms was 
positive in some years and negative in others, when the repayment of old credits outweighed new 
disbursements. Whereas ODA to low income countries increased year on year over the period 
1999-2003, net non-concessional lending from the IMF rose sharply in 2001 and 2003 but fell in 
2000 and 2002. This pattern implies that any association between aid flows and IMF lending is 
far from tight. 
  Information concerning the destination of IMF lending and ODA is provided by Table 2, 
which shows data for the top twenty recipients of IMF assistance and ODA. As can be seen, 
some low-income countries appear on both lists (Pakistan, Cameroon, Mozambique, Tanzania,   11
Kenya, Ghana, Nicaragua, Zambia, Senegal, and Uganda), but others appear on only one of the 
lists. Appearing only on the top twenty list of IMF lending are Madagascar, Papua New Guinea, 
Tajikistan, Rwanda, Kyrgyz Republic, Gabon, Congo, Chad, Sierra Leone, and Maldova, while 
appearing only on the top twenty list of ODA recipients are Vietnam, India, Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, Malawi, Cambodia, Nepal, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The descriptive data imply that, while there is some overlap between the IMF and bi-
lateral donors, the match is not complete. They hint at a positive relationship, with IMF lending 
and bi-lateral aid being complementary. But they also suggest that IMF lending and aid are not 
perfect complements. 
 
4. Data, Methodology and Results 
 
  In order to test the ideas discussed in Section 2, an unbalanced panel of low-income 
countries, as defined by the World Bank, was examined for the period 1974-2000. Due to 
missing data, the 785 observations include only 48 low-income countries. This sample was then 
used to investigate the relationship between ODA flows and various country characteristics. Data 
sources and definitions are provided in Appendix 2.  
  The dependent variable was ODA, comprising grants and concessional official loans net 
of repayments. The explanatory variables were chosen to reflect those key influences over aid   12
identified by previous studies (see Powell, 2003, for a review of them), supplemented by 
measures of IMF involvement in the country concerned. 
  Countries are characterized by income levels (GNP per capita, in both a linear and 
squared form), population (both linear and squared), and a variety of economic performance 
measures. These include GDP growth (lagged), the imports-to-GDP ratio (lagged), real 
international interest rates, the reserve-to-imports ratio (lagged), the debt-service ratio, the lagged 
debt-to-GDP ratio (linear and squared), the rate of real exchange rate depreciation (lagged), the 
number of recent debt reschedulings, and the level of civil freedoms. Variables were lagged to 
avoid confounding the effects of current aid flows on their value.  
Our prior expectations are that ODA flows will be positively related to debt service 
levels, population and debt (though both at a declining rate), and the real interest rate (reflecting 
lower flows on debt that are likely to occur when interest rates are high). In turn, ODA flows are 
expected to decline with per capita GNP, economic growth, reserve adequacy, and the presence 
of recent reschedulings (indicating both a likely reduced need as well as a movement away from 
the bi-lateral debt flows that dominate ODA, due to debt difficulties).  The effects of the real 
exchange rate and import levels on ODA flows are more contentious. A depreciating real 
exchange rate may indicate less need for official financing if trade adjustment actually occurs, 
but may also signal the seriousness of the government regarding adjustment. A low import-to-
GDP ratio may indicate greater need for development assistance and restructuring due to low 
levels of integration with the world economy, suggesting that the coefficient should be negative. 
Alternatively, however, low import levels may also signal that the economy is more insulated 
from external shocks and less in need of external financing. Finally, the relationship between 
ODA and civil freedom is similarly ambiguous, being driven more by politics than economics.   13
Note that a negative coefficient for civil freedoms suggests that greater freedoms imply more 
ODA flows.  
  The measures of IMF involvement include the number of months in the current year in 
which the country is engaged in each of four separate high conditionality programmes (SBA, 
EFF, SAF, and ESAF/PRGF). In addition, there are indicators of the number of recent IMF 
programmes, the number of recent uncompleted IMF programmes, and the amount of IMF 
purchases in that year as a proportion of GDP. 
  The estimations were conducted using two techniques. Ordinary least squares regressions 
on the full sample and on two period sub-samples (1974-1988 with 385 observations, and 1989-
2000 with 463 observations) were initially estimated. These estimations were augmented using a 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation procedure to correct for potential 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the panel data. Table 3 presents the results of the full 
sample FGLS estimations, which are comparable to those of the OLS estimations (not reported 
here). 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
  The results of the estimation yield several interesting results. In terms of the non-IMF 
variables, the findings are consistent with most previous analyses, and largely consistent with our 
priors. Due to the restriction of the sample to the poorest developing countries, the estimated 
coefficients for GNP per capita are statistically insignificant, suggesting that there is no strong 
discrimination between countries in this sample on the basis of per capita income. Flows of ODA 
are significantly related to population, however, with more populous countries attracting higher 
levels of ODA, though at a declining rate (as shown by the negative coefficient estimate on the   14
squared population term). Countries that were less integrated into the world economy via trade 
(low imports-to-GDP ratio) and with less adequate levels of reserves received more ODA. These 
relationships were particularly strong in the later period, with reserve adequacy having no 
significant effect in the 1974-1988 sample period. 
  ODA flows were also affected by a country’s debt situation. Periods of relatively high 
real international interest rates were associated with lower ODA flows. Furthermore, high debt 
service ratios (debt service payments to exports) were associated with higher inflows of ODA in 
the full sample, reflecting a strongly significant association in the later period. Levels of debt, 
however, had the reverse correlation. In both the full sample and the later period, the debt-to-
GDP ratio had no statistically significant effect, while in the earlier sub-sample higher levels of 
debt were connected with higher ODA inflows, though at a declining rate as debt increased. Past 
debt rescheduling episodes were not associated with ODA flows in any of the three sample 
periods. 
  Of the remaining non-IMF variables, growth rates and rates of real exchange rate 
depreciation had statistically insignificant estimated coefficients. Interest rates did affect ODA 
flows negatively and significantly in the second period; an effect that was offset in the full 
sample by a weakly significant positive effect in the early period. Higher levels of civil freedoms 
were associated with significantly higher inflows of ODA for this group of countries in the full 
sample, reflecting its strong influence in the later period. 
  For the IMF variables the story that emerges from the estimations is consistent across the 
samples. There is nothing to suggest that the Fund’s influence has become stronger in the most 
recent period when the Cold War thawed and conditionality began to include a structural as well 
as a macroeconomic component. The non-concessional SBA and EFF agreements did not   15
significantly affect ODA flows for poorer countries. The concessional IMF programmes (SAF 
which was gradually replaced by ESAF and PRGF) did have a strongly significant and positive 
link to ODA flows. For the sample as a whole, SAF programmes were associated with an 
increase in ODA flows of approximately $US 3 million, while ESAF/PRGF agreements were 
associated with an additional inflow of approximately $US 2.5 million. 
  An interesting question is how to interpret the results relating to the IMF’s involvement. 
Conventionally, the catalytic effect of IMF programmes has rested on their liquidity and 
conditionality components. Our results suggest that in the case of foreign aid, and as we 
anticipated in Section 2, the liquidity role is unimportant. However, even the conditionality role 
is open to some question since having a record of incomplete programmes in the past does not 
seem to exert a significant impact on contemporary ODA flows. In addition, programmes often 
deemed to have more rigorous conditionality (such as the EFF) do not display any positive 
association. Donors do not seem to be dissuaded from providing aid as a consequence of poor 
past implementation. Perhaps they view the causes of poor implementation as being beyond the 
control of the governments concerned and are therefore reluctant to penalize them. Alternatively, 
donors may be looking for something more different from conditionality and do not concern 
themselves with its details or its previous implementation. Perhaps they are content to delegate 
the design and monitoring of conditionality to the IMF, with the Fund’s endorsement of a 
programme providing sufficient justification for them to support it financially. A third possibility 
that is consistent with our findings is that the IMF is playing a co-ordination role bringing 
countries and aid donors together. IMF programmes provide the context for doing this. The 
strong statistical association we discover may therefore be capturing this co-ordination role as 
opposed to a strictly catalytic role that is played out via liquidity and signaling.
 10   16
5. Policy Issues 
 
  For poor countries borrowing from the IMF’s concessionary lending window, Fund 
programmes and foreign aid seem to go together. While it is difficult to tease out the exact causal 
relationship, it seems more likely that IMF programmes crowd in foreign aid rather than crowd it 
out. There is a simplistic appeal to the notion that the comparative advantage of the Fund lies in 
providing balance of payments finance and in vetting and monitoring programmes of economic 
reform, while that of aid donors lies in providing longer term development finance. The 
connection may well be that donors believe that aid is more effective when accompanied by the 
sorts of policies supported by the IMF. It also raises the question of whether they would be 
equally impressed by World Bank conditionality.
11 If donors attribute this role to the IMF, the 
current debate about whether the Fund can endorse and monitor a programme without using its 
own resources has some analytical foundation. Both the IMF and aid donors have a mutually 
supportive role to play in helping to achieve the MDGs. 
  But policy issues remain. Can the specifics of conditionality, the design of the PRGF, and 
the mechanisms for monitoring programmes be changed to maximize ODA flows? If the 
financing gap remains large due to a weak response from official sources, should the IMF 
expand its own lending, or should it impose more rigorous aggregate demand compression to 
bring about more rapid adjustment? Should the Fund become more directly active in seeking to 
coerce donors to give aid when indirect channels remain relatively weak?  What is the correct 
balance between the Fund’s roles as advocate for, and overseer of, its low-income member 
countries? These are all complex issues, and our analysis here sheds only a little light on them. 
However, whereas the claim that an important part of the IMF’s role is to induce private capital   17
inflows to client countries via the catalytic effect of IMF programmes remains empirically 
elusive as a general proposition, the evidence reported in this paper suggests that a policy based 
on strengthening the influence of the IMF on aid flows may at least be grounded in the evidence 
of an historically positive association. 
  In addition to seeking to influence aid flows by increasing their effectiveness, the Fund 
could also focus on some of the weaknesses of aid in terms of its instability and its procyclicality 
(Bulir and Lane, 2004). A lending role may also remain for the Fund in protecting long term 
development strategies financed by aid flows from external shocks emanating from the current 
account of the balance of payments. In this respect current discussions to incorporate a 
compensatory shock-related component within a reformed PRGF or to redesign the 
Compensatory Financing Facility are well timed. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
  A superficial glance at the portfolio of IMF credits confirms that the Fund is heavily 
involved with developing countries. It is unsurprising that there has been considerable interest in 
the part the IMF can play in helping to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
  One argument that has been made during the debate is that the IMF is a short term 
financial institution whereas developing countries need long term development assistance. While 
the Fund concerns itself with monetary growth, inflation and reserve levels, developing countries 
are concerned about reducing poverty, infant mortality and hunger, and improving education. 
This approach sees the IMF as a stabilization agency that is ill-equipped to deal with long term 
development issues. Since the Millennium Development Goals relate to development, this   18
approach further argues that the Fund has little part to play in helping to achieve them. Instead 
foreign aid holds centre stage. 
  A counter-argument is that sustained economic development requires a stable 
macroeconomic environment. Macroeconomic disequilibria in the form of inflation and 
overvalued exchange rates undermine development. Alongside aid donors and the World Bank, 
this view sees the Fund as having a part to play in helping to achieve the MDGs. It can help 
establish an appropriate macroeconomic framework and ensure that macroeconomic 
mismanagement does not threaten development. It can at the same time support domestically 
designed and nationally owned structural adjustment that strengthens the supply side and 
increases the efficiency of demand side policy instruments. It can provide contingent financial 
assistance so that balance of payments crises associated with external shocks do not lead to large 
output declines and sudden stops or reversals to development. And it can play a key role in co-
ordinating aid and economic reform. In short, it can be a strategically important agency in 
exerting a positive effect on development without becoming a development agency. 
  This paper has sought to add to the debate about the Fund’s role in developing countries 
by empirically examining the nature of the relationship between IMF programmes and bi-lateral 
aid flows. The evidence supports the idea of synergy between the IMF and aid donors that the 
theoretical analysis anticipates. This, in turn, implies that a combination of IMF involvement in 
conjunction with foreign aid may make a more powerful contribution to meeting the MDGs than 
aid on its own. In any case, it may be via IMF involvement that developing countries have the 
best chance of attracting foreign aid. In turn, Fund programmes that can induce a reliable 
increase in bi-lateral ODA will allow for less harsh short-term demand compression, thereby 
easing both the economic and political pain of adjustment.   19
  This is not to argue that there is no need for reform within the Fund, or amongst aid 
donors or within aid receiving countries. There is scope for beneficial reform across all three. 
But it is to argue that reform has something upon which to build. The Fund’s role in achieving 
the MDGs may be strategically important. Achieving them would not be helped by the IMF 
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Appendix 2: Data definitions and sources. 
‘ODA’. Disbursements of concessional loans (net of principal repayments) from official sources, 
plus grants. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators “Official development 
Assistance and Official Aid (Current $US)”, recalibrated for millions of dollars.  
 
‘Months of the Years with an SBA program’. Number of months of the current year in which a 
stand-by agreement is in effect. Source: IMF, IMF Annual Report, various years.  This variable 
is repeated for EFF, SAF and ESAF programs in place of SBA. 
 
‘Number of recent incomplete IMF agreements’. The number of agreements in the past five 
years which were “incomplete” according to the methodology of Killick et al, that is agreements 
with more than 20% of the commitment undrawn by the country at the time of expiry. Source: 
IMF, IMF Annual Report, various years.  
 
‘Recent IMF arrangements’. A binary variable indicating whether an IMF arrangement has been 
in place for the country in any of the previous two years. Source: IMF, IMF Annual Report 
various years. 
 
‘IMF purchases-to-GDP ratio’.  The ratio of purchases from the IMF in the current year (from 
IMF Global Development Finance), divided by the GDP (from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators).  
 
‘GNP per capita’. GNI per capita in thousands of $U.S., Atlas method (World Bank, World 
Development Indicator) deflated by U.S. consumer price index (IMF: IMF Financial Statistics). 
 
‘Population’. Number of persons (in millions). Source: World Bank, World Development 
Induicators.  
 
‘Lagged GDP growth’.  Percentage change in GDP from the previous year (annual %), lagged 
one year. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. 
 
‘Lagged imports-to-GDP ratio’.  Imports of goods and services divided by GDP, both in current 
$US, lagged by one year. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.  
 
‘Real international interest rates’. The London Interbank Offered Rate on U.S. 6 month Treasury 
Bills (annual average) less the rate of U.S. CPI inflation. Source: IMF, IMF Financial Statistics.  
 
‘Lagged reserves-to-imports’. Total foreign reserves divided by total imports of goods and 
services (both in current $US), lagged by one year. Source: World Bank, Global Development 
Indicators.  
 
‘Debt-service ratio’. Total long-term debt service payments divided by total exports of goods and 
services (all in U.S. dollars).  Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
‘Lagged debt-to-GDP ratio’.  Total public and publicly guaranteed debt, divided by GDP (both in 
current $US), lagged by one year. Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators.   22
 
‘Lagged real exchange rate depreciation’. The official number of domestic currency units per 
$U.S. multiplied by the ratio of the U.S. consumer price index to the country’s consumer price 
index.  This number is calculated for the current year and for three years previously (adjusting 
for changes in base years) and the difference between the two is expressed as a proportion of the 
value from three years before. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.  
 
‘Past rescheduling’. The number of years out of the previous two years in which a country 
rescheduled some portion of its official or private interest or principal repayments. Source: 
World Bank, Global Development Finance.  
 
‘Civil freedoms’.  A qualitative variable in which 1 represented the most political freedom and 7 
represented the least. Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The IMF also exerts an effect on the supply side of economies through the structural conditionality incorporated 
into loans under the Fund’s concessionary lending facility, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. 
2 A clear statement of this point of view may be found in the Meltzer Report (IFIAC, 2000). 
3 On this basis broader and deeper conditionality would signal problems that were more extensive and intensive. 
4 For a review of some of this evidence see Bird (1996). 
5Alesina and Dollar (2000) provide a recent empirical analysis of bi-lateral aid flows which emphasizes the 
importance of donors’ interests. But plenty of earlier studies have made a similar point. 
6 This has been confirmed by the authors’ conversations with aid donors, reported briefly in Bird and Rowlands 
(2000) 
7 The study by Dollar and Burnside (2000) is seminal in providing empirical evidence to support this view. Although 
aspects of their study have been criticized (for example, Hansen and Tarp, 2001, Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 
2004 ), the basic idea that aid effectiveness can be enhanced by the pursuit of good domestic policies has remained 
intact. For a review of recent research in aid effectiveness see Hudson (2004) and the references therein. 
8 There is also a possibility that a sequence of programmes that accentuate fiscal adjustments lead to a tapering out 
of aid as donors no longer see it as necessary to cover fiscal deficits (Collier and Gunning, 1999). The IEO (2003), 
however, finds little empirical support for a tapering out effect of IMF programmes on aid, and our evidence does 
not suggest that prolonged involvement with the IMF leads to a decline in aid flows. 
9 A growing number of studies investigate the determinants of implementation (see, for example, Ivanova et al, 
2001,  Dreher, 2003, and Bird and Willett, 2004). 
10 Our results are broadly consistent with those reported by Powell (2003). Although his focus is on the relationship 
between debt relief and aid, he constructs a model in which he uses IMF programmes under the ESAF and PRGF 
facilities that are on track as a proxy for macroeconomic performance. Taking sixty IDA only countries for which 
data is available over the period 1996-2000, he finds that the IMF variable is highly significant and positive. While 
causality may be a matter for debate, Powell points out that “donors often insist that an IMF programme be in place 
and on track before they will disburse concessional programme assistance (as opposed to project finance, which is 
not typically explicitly linked to an IMF programme” (p.13). The implication here is that catalysis is working via the 
conditionality incorporated in IMF programmes rather than via the additional liquidity they provide. This may be the 
case, although our results question just how important the implementation of conditionality is. Powell does not 
examine this since he only includes programmes that are on track so he does not test to see what difference it makes 
if the programmes are off track. See also Rowlands and Ketcheson (2002) for a related discussion of the issues. 
11 Bird and Rowlands (2001) find that there is little evidence to support the idea of a catalytic effect in association 
with World Bank lending. The supposition that catalysis is likely to be stronger in the case of the IMF than the 
World Bank is supported by qualitative as well as quantitative evidence (Bird and Rowlands, 2000). 
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Table 1: Financial Flows to Low Income Countries (millions of US$). 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Net financial flows from IMF 
(IMF concessional current US $) 
136.3 34.3 421.4 94.7 385.1  1,918.0 
Net financial flows from IMF 
non-concessional 
268.7 -272.1 127.7 -574.7 -670.4  -1,120.8 
ODA + official aid (net of 
repayments) 
20,122.2 20,290.5 22,991.2 27,590.0 32,128.3  123,122.2 
Private capital flows net (DRS 
current US $) 
12,633.3 15,099.1 13,479.0 13,972.0 21,541.3 76,721.7 
Excluding India, Angola, Nigeria, 
Vietnam and Sudan 
5,287.4 3,658.6 3,981.0 4,758.7 5,494.3  23,180.1 
 




Table 2: Top Twenty Recipients of ODA and IMF Lending 
 
ODA 2000  IMF Flows 2000 
Country  ODA (US$)  Country  Gross flows (US$) 
Vietnam 1,681,750,000  Pakistan  194,700,000 
India 1,485,210,000  Cameroon  86,500,000 
Bangladesh 1,171,330,000  Mozambique  59,600,000 
Tanzania 1,022,030,000  Tanzania  52,800,000 
Mozambique 877,000,000  Madagascar  50,100,000 
Uganda 819,440,000  Kenya  44,300,000 
Zambia  795,110,000  Papua New Guinea  38,100,000 
Pakistan 702,770,000  Ghana  35,300,000 
Ethiopia 692,970,000  Nicaragua  26,600,000 
Ghana 600,430,000  Zambia  26,400,000 
Nicaragua 561,540,000  Tajikistan  25,500,000 
Kenya 512,140,000  Rwanda  25,100,000 
Malawi 446,300,000  Kyrgyz  Republic  18,900,000 
Senegal 423,460,000  Senegal  18,800,000 
Cambodia 398,420,000  Gabon  17,400,000 
Nepal 389,600,000  Congo,  Rep.  13,900,000 
Cameroon 379,940,000  Chad  13,700,000 
Mali 359,720,000  Sierra  Leone  13,700,000 
Côte d’Ivoire  351,830,000  Moldova  12,200,000 
Burkina Faso  336,010,000  Uganda  11,800,000 
 
Source: World Bank Indicators database 
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Table 3: Feasible Generalized Least Squares Regression Results: Poor country ODA flows 
 
Variable Estimated  Coefficient  Normal  statistic 
Months of the year with an SBA program 
|Months of the year with an EFF program 
Months of the year with an SAF program 
Months of the year with an ESAF program 
Recent incomplete IMF programs 
Number of recent IMF arrangements 
IMF purchases-to-GDP ratio 
GNP per capita  
squared per capita GNP 
population 
squared population 
lagged GDP growth rate 
lagged imports-to-GDP ratio 
real international interest rates 
lagged reserves-to-imports ratio 
debt service ratio 
lagged debt-to-GDP ratio 
squared lagged debt-to-GDP ratio 
















































Number of observations 
Log likelihood 
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